Rich Mountain Battlefield

From Rich Mountain

Rich Mountain Battlefield lies a few miles from the town of Beverly, West Virginia along the old Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike. “It’s a turnpike,” I told my wife. “How bad can it be?” The old road is now used mainly by recreational vehicles. Surfaced in gravel, it snakes its way up the mountain to the site of the battle between Federal forces under William S. Rosecrans and a small Confederate detachment under Captain Julius De Lagnel. This is not one for the faint-hearted, but the site is accessible by car and is well worth the time to visit.

Rich Mountain, a minor skirmish by late war standards, loomed large in the early careers of Rosecrans and George McClellan. Of more significance, McClellan’s indecision in the face of uncertainty here foreshadowed his efforts in later campaigns. McClellan sent Rosecrans with 2000 men, guided by a local farmer’s son, to flank the rebel position at Camp Garnett at the western foot of Rich Mountain. The march was expected to take three hours. Ten hours later, Rosecrans finally reached his flanking position at the Hart House.

Lieutenant Colonel John Pegram, commanding the 1300 troops at Camp Garnett, dispatched five infantry companies (perhaps 350 men) and a six pounder under the command of Captain De Lagnel to defend an overgrown track near the Hart House at the crest of the mountain. Ironically, though De Lagnel was in the right place to intercept Rosecrans, he faced his line in the wrong direction, expecting an attack from the North. Skirmishers from both sides clashed at Rosecrans closed in on the Hart House. Though the rebels anticipated an attack from the opposite direction, the Federals labored under the false assumption that all of the Confederate defenders were at Camp Garnett..

Despite their initial confusion, De Lagnel’s troops managed to repulse the first two Federal attacks. The Confederates let out a cheer and assumed they had won the day. Rosecrans, undaunted, launched another assault and carried the position.

Meanwhile, McClellan, fretting in the absence of any communications from Rosecrans, called off his supporting attack until the following day. Pegram’s grasp of the situation was no better. Hearing the cheers of De Lagnel’s men, he assumed his forces had achieved victory, and was dismayed to learn of their defeat. Even worse, his main escape route along the turnpike was now occupied by a superior force. Determined to avoid capture, Pegram set out in an attempt to escape the trap. Two days later, exhausted, hungry, and possibly lost, he decided to surrender his command.

The battlefield today consists of a small tract at the top of Rich Mountain near the site of the Hart House. The house no longer stands and trees have encroached upon much of what open pasture there was at the time, so interpretation of the site takes a bit of imagination.

Several plaques detail the action and guide visitors to the stable yard, a key to the rebel defense. Large flat rocks cover the ground here, and several contain inscriptions left by veterans of the action. Standing at the foot of the wooded slope from which Rosecrans launched his attack, visitors can easily imagine the consternation in the rebel ranks as they reoriented their defense to repel an assault from the opposite direction.

Though I lacked the time to explore Camp Garnett further west along the turnpike, the site boasts well preserved earthworks and is certainly worth a visit. Rich Mountain Battlefield would not exist today but for the efforts of the (http://www.richmountain.org). See their web site for information on the campaign and battle, as well as a schedule of events.

A Matter of Interpretation

While browsing the Harpers Ferry NPS site to plan a hike of Maryland Heights, I learned the park houses the Harpers Ferry Center. The center develops Long Range Interpretive Plans for other park units. One recently developed plan outlines changes for Fort Donelson National Battlefield (this is a PDF file).

I have not read the plan in its entirety, but did note several items of interest. The plan recognizes an increasing lack of historical knowledge among general visitors, a need for modernization, and a lack of interpretive resources and staff (professional and volunteer). The plan also argues that interpretation must recognize the larger impact of the battle on slaves, civilians, and women, rather than focus simply on the military aspects of the site. Couched within these arguments is the conviction that the cultural shifts change not only the questions we ask of history, but the relevance of various aspects of it.

I applaud a more comprehensive interpretive approach so long as the war and the battlefield itself are not de-emphasized to the point of insignificance in the quest for cultural relevance. I am reminded of the debate on the new museum at the Gettysburg visitors center. I am all for a comprehensive approach to interpretation that still recognizes the paramount importance of the specific site and the battlefield in question. The new Gettysburg facility does so, with one exception. I was disappointed by the decision to display such a limited portion of the artifacts available in the park’s collection, and the assumption that large displays of firearms or other artifacts are somehow not important. In light of that, I would offer this plea: in the effort to ensure that no group is marginalized by the interpretive efforts of these sites, let’s not forget the good-old-fashioned Civil War buffs who visit these places regularly year after year, and who think that the stories of these battles and the soldiers who fought them are worth telling and re-telling from generation to generation.

A Quick Visit to Monocacy National Battlefield

Monocacy National Battlefield has been in the news recently because Frederick County, MD planned to build a waste to energy facility, basically an incinerator, within sight of many core areas of the battlefield. The board of supervisors recently dropped the proposal by a vote of 5-1. While this is certainly good news, we can only hope the idea never resurfaces.

I visited Monocacy briefly at the end of April. Changes in the park over the last few years are impressive and exciting. The new visitors center expands on the exhibits available in the former Gambrills Mill facility, from a more attractive display of the fiber optic map to interactive displays for younger visitors. A new tour stop now exists on the Best Farm, site of the skirmishing north of the Washington Turnpike Bridge and also of several Confederate battery positions.

With the addition of the Best Farm to the Thomas and Worthington Farms already included in the park, it now encompasses most of the corps areas of the battlefield where Early’s troops struggled against veterans of Rickett’s division of the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Sadly, with the exception of a small city park featuring several Civil War Trails markers, the Jug Bridge (northern) sector has not been preserved.

While visiting, I purchased B.Franklin Cooling’s Monocacy, The Battle that Saved Washington. Cooling’s work places the campaign in context, captures Wallace’s desperation as commander of a hastily assembled defense force, and explains the reasons for Early’s failure to seize the Washington fortifications following his victory at Monocacy. It is a serviceable account with sufficient tactical detail, though the maps are a bit lacking. I look forward to the upcoming account (2010?) by J.D. Petruzzi and Eric Wittenberg. Given their previous work, we can expect a first rate tactical account, as well as a driving/hiking tour of campaign and battle sites.

I plan to spend more time at Monocacy this summer, and will likely post on the Thomas and Worthington Farm trails, where most of the heavy fighting occurred.

Hauser's Ridge (Nicodemus Heights, Part 2)

From Hauser's Ridge Map

Their position atop Nicodemus Heights rendered ineffective by the West Woods as Federal Soldiers closed in on the Dunker Church, Pelham’s batteries limbered up and redeployed on Hauser’s Ridge to the south. The western edge of the West Woods hugs the base of the ridge, which rises steadily to its crest perhaps 200-300 yards farther west. Here, as if by design, the rebels deployed their guns directly in the path of the advance of Sedgwick’s Division of the Second Corps.

Edwin “Bull” Sumner led Sedgwick’s men forward to clear the West Woods. This accomplished, he planned a massive left wheel by the entire division to clear the northern part of the battlefield all the way to the town of Sharpsburg. Initially, the advance met with little resistance. As they emerged from the tree line, they met a storm of shot and shell from the batteries atop Hauser’s ridge. Remnants of Jackson’s Division joined in to halt the Federal advance. This was the first of several shocks that would virtually destroy Sedgwick’s Division as a fighting force for the balance of the battle.

Sedgwick’s lead brigade under Gorman faltered under a withering fire from the ridge in their. The 1st Minnesota, Gorman’s right flank regiment, suffered 118 casualties within minutes. In the center, the 15th Massachusetts regiment lost 348 men, over 50% of its strength. The commander of the 15th, Lt. Colonel John W. Kimball, reported twice driving off the batteries in his front before the left of the brigade collapsed under the weight of the flank attack by McLaws’s Division.

While the artillery fire was not the decisive factor in Sedgwick’s repulse, the rebel guns on Hauser’s ridge stalled the Federal advance and amplified the devastation of McLaws’s slashing attack from the south. Here, as on Nicodemus Heights farther north, Confederate artillerists established local superiority, providing critical support to their outnumbered infantry in tactical situations where their Federal counterparts lacked effective artillery support. Both positions were outside the range of McClellan’s large caliber rifles that so dominated the area around the Dunker Church, the “artillery hell” described by S.D. Lee, commander of the rebel artillery battalion assigned there. Pelham and other Confederate artillerists used this advantage to provide aggressive and effective support at the right place and time, materially assisting Jackson’s troops in their defensive efforts on that bloody morning.

Nicodemus Heights (Spring Hike at Antietam National Battlefield)

Federal soldiers move forward through the dense stalks of corn, heavy with the dampness of the morning fog that lingers along the banks of the Antietam. They march with the grim determination of veterans. From another cornfield crowning the ridge to their right, the hollow boom of artillery shatters the silence and soon the shot knocks men and stalks about indiscriminately. First one gun, then another, until it seems the distant hilltop is alive with fire and smoke.

Atop Nicodemus Heights, Confederate gunners of Stuart’s Horse Artillery under Major John Pelham cannot believe their luck. One thousand yards to the front, the men of Hooker’s I Corps of the Army of the Potomac drive south into the Cornfield. Their guns are positioned squarely on the flank of Hooker’s assault. Seldom does artillery find itself with such a target of opportunity, and Pelham is not one to neglect it. For nearly ninety minutes, his batteries rain shot and shell on the hapless Federals.

Finally, as Hooker continues to advance toward the Dunker Church, the West Woods screens his right, and Pelham’s gunners withdraw south to Hauser’s Ridge. Soon Sedgwick’s division of the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac will drive to the edge of the woods, right beneath the muzzles of Pelham’s guns. Caught in a merciless rain of shell and canister from their front and the scything volleys of rebel infantry attacking their left, Sedgwick’s division disintegrates and will not fight again this day.

A number of Federal officers called attention to the commanding artillery position on their right, but no troops could be spared from the main effort. And as the tide of battle shifted south and the rebel guns shifted their position accordingly, the matter was perhaps forgotten.

Today, Nicodemus Heights lies entirely on private property. Though the crest of the hill is still visible beyond the Hagerstown Pike to the west of the Miller Cornfield, trees have obscured much of the field of fire enjoyed by Pelham’s gunners on the day of the battle. Early Spring provides the best opportunity to understand the significance of this ground in the morning phase of the battle of Antietam. Ranger Brian Baracz recently conducted a tour of Nicodemus Heights and Hauser’s Ridge, and I had the opportunity to explore this area of the battlefield that is normally inaccessible to the public.

We started off from the North Woods and crossed the Hagerstown Pike to the Nicodemus farm. The elevation dropped sharply as we moved across the Pike. A series of small hillocks mark the site of the Nicodemus house, perhaps 200 yards to the west. Confederate reports mention “leapfrogging” among these later in the day as they changed position to present a more difficult target to Federal gunners on the Poffenberger farm and in the Cornfield. The field of fire from these positions is now largely obscured by trees.

The ground dipped once again as we moved west toward Nicodemus Heights, which rises so abruptly one wonders how Pelham’s gunners managed to deploy their pieces on its crest. The view from the crest encompasses the scene of the morning’s fight from the North Woods to the Cornfield at a distance of approximately 1000 yards – effective range for both smoothbore and rifled guns. The sharp crest of the heights presents a narrow target, and Brian noted that a large number of Federal rounds were found imbedded in the steep western face of the hill. The West Woods obscures the battlefield to the south of the Cornfield. Once Hooker’s advance cleared the Miller farm, Pelham’s gunners limbered up and headed south in search of a more effective position. Strangely, no Federal forces occupied the ground despite its obvious tactical advantages.

Up next: Confederate Artillery on Hauser’s Ridge Shatters Sedgwick’s Assault, plus pictures from the hike.

Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It (William Garrett Piston and Richard W. Hatcher III, UNC Press)

As the people of the North measured their disappointment in the wake of disaster at Bull Run, General Nathaniel Lyon set out with another inexperienced Federal army to drive rebel forces from Missouri. The resulting battle at Wilson’s Creek cost Lyon his life, and though his army suffered another defeat, Confederate ambitions in Missouri were dealt a blow from which they never quite recovered.

The first major theme the authors develop demonstrates a unique facet of the armies at this early stage of the war. Drawing upon letters, diaries, and newspaper accounts, they suggest loyalty to the company, and a corresponding pride in their hometown or county, motivated the soldiers of 1861. This contrasts with developments later in the war, when men identified themselves more closely with their regiments.

The authors also focus attention on the unique command situations of Lyon’s army and the tensions between Ben McCulloch, commander of Confederate forces in the area, and Sterling Price, commander of the Missouri State Guard. Lyon emerges as a possibly deranged crusader bent on wiping the stain of secession from the earth, and a man capable of decisive action who nevertheless questioned his decisions on the very eve of battle. His death on the field of battle spared him any recriminations, and established his place among northern heroes in the early days of the war. Piston and Hatcher also detail the difficulties between Price and McCulloch that would eventually lead to an inability to cooperate effectively later in the campaign.

As expected, a substantial portion of the book details the battle itself. The authors do not disappoint. The confusion and chaos of this struggle between two inexperienced armies emerges with surprising clarity and detailed maps complement the text. Piston and Hatcher’s book has already become the standard work on this pivotal campaign. This book will satisfy those searching for a detailed treatment of the battle of Wilson’s Creek, and also serves as a penetrating look into the psychology of the armies that took the filed in the early days of the Civil War.

Note: As this review ran a bit long, I included it as a regular post.

Fredericksburg Part 2: Franklin's Assault

As you follow the tour road South and leave behind the determination and despair of the struggle for the Sunken Road, Fredericksburg becomes quite a different battlefield. Thoughts of senseless slaughter at the foot of Marye’s Heights give way to considerations of lost opportunities.

The center of Lee’s position was nearly unassailable, anchored on the commanding height of Howison’s Hill. Here Lee positioned his headquarters and also placed the army’s largest field pieces – a pair of 30 pound Parrott Rifles. The lunettes constructed for these pieces still exist, though the view from both sites is now largely obscured by tree growth. The tour road runs through modern woods along the remains of the earthworks that run the entire length of Lee’s lines, so the view from your car seat is limited at best.

Dismount for the trail to Bernard’s Cabins (see my previous post), as well as the site where Meade’s division breached A.P. Hill’s line and Brigadier General Maxcy Gregg received a mortal wound attempting to stem the tide of the Federal advance. Note the ravine just within the tree line descending eastward. At the time of the battle, the ravine descended to a marshy area considered impassible to attacking troops. Hill left this area largely uncovered, and Meade’s attacking troop exploited the gap, finding the march was not such an obstacle as the rebel commander thought. Had Meade received timely support, perhaps the Federal effort here would have turned the tide of battle against Lee.

Continuing South, you emerge from the woodline along the slopes of Prospect Hill, where Jackson deployed the bulk of his artillery. The hill ascends sharply from the gently rising plain to the east. Though trees now cover much of the field, the railroad embankment perhaps two hundred yards from Jackson’s position afforded the only protection available to attacking Federals during their assault.

The monument across the tracks at the base of the hill, popularly known as the Meade Pyramid, was actually one of several erected by the railroad after the war to mark sites of historical significance along its lines. Meade’s troops penetrated Hill’s lines just to the north of the pyramid.

The guns lining Prospect Hill to the south mark the right of Jackson’s position. These guns had a commanding view of much of the plain to the east where Franklin’s troops formed up, and yet the area was nicknamed “Dead Horse Hill” as a testament to the effectiveness of the Federal bombardment prior to their attack. Stuart’s cavalry and additional artillery extended the line to the east in a broad arc encompassing the area of the Federal deployment. Far out in front of the right flank, John Pelham fought two guns with such effectiveness and against such extreme odds that Robert E. Lee marveled to see “such courage in one so young.” See my previous post on the Pelham marker for details.

The battlefield of Fredericksburg truly presents as study in contrasts. While development has encroached upon the Sunken Road and Pelham’s Corner, the recent acquisition of the Slaughter Pen Farm on the southern part of the field represents one of the most significant preservation victories in recent memory. And while Burnside wasted the lives of his men in fruitless assaults against Marye’s Heights, Franklin squandered the Federals’ one real opportunity to win the battle, failing to support Meade’s breakthrough and turning in a generally mediocre performance. In the end, this battle was indecisive, another misstep for Lincoln along the path toward an effective commander for the Army of the Potomac. Nevertheless, there are few sites that inspire reflection and appreciation of courage and sacrifice like the sunken road and the stone wall at the base of Marye’s Heights.